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Why have Israeli-Palestinian peace talks
ignored the importance of good mapmaking?

lessons
fromthe

swiss
cheese
map
by shari motro

I

n september 1995, after months of tense
negotiations over what would be Israel’s first significant withdrawal from the West Bank, the Israeli
delegation to the Oslo II peace talks unveiled before
their Palestinian counterparts the now infamous
“Swiss cheese” map. The map was introduced just
24 hours before the agreement was to be signed. When
Yasir Arafat saw it, he stormed out of the negotiating
room. Uri Savir, Israel’s chief negotiator at the talks,
recalls the Palestinian leader’s reaction:
Arafat glared at [the map] in silence, then sprang
out of his chair and declared it to be an insu≠erable
humiliation.
“These are cantons! You want me to accept cantons!
You want to destroy me!”

official oslo ii map The infamous “Swiss cheese” map.
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survey of israel, idf mapping unit [interim agreement (oslo ii) official map]

Up until that point, the Israeli team had insisted on focusing
discussions with the Palestinians on the text of the agreement,
which had gone through countless drafts—maps were o≠ limits.
As one of the soldiers accompanying the Israeli delegation, I
came to appreciate the meticulous care with which the verbal
components of the agreement were negotiated. My duties
included translating parts of the agreement from English (the
o≤cial language of the agreement) into Hebrew so that, as soon
as it was signed, it could be sent to the Knesset (Israel’s Parliament) for ratification.
During the final weeks of the marathon negotiations, I would
receive the latest marked-up draft, update my translation, and
review my work with Gilad Sher, one of the delegation’s most
respected attorneys. Every word mattered. Israeli troops were
slated to “redeploy,” not “withdraw,” from parts of the “West
Bank,” not from the biblical lands of “Judea and Samaria.” The
agreement made no mention of a future Palestinian state; it
stressed, rather, that the ultimate goal of the Oslo process was to
reach “a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.” These resolutions demand that Israel withdraw from territories occupied in the 1967 war, including the
West Bank.
The Interim Agreement, the fruit of the Oslo II talks, divided the
West Bank into three areas: A, B, and C. Area A, which included the
West Bank’s major population centers but ultimately comprised
only 3 percent of its area, would immediately come under full
Palestinian control. Area B, which included more sparsely populated Palestinian communities and comprised 24 percent of the
West Bank, would be subject to joint Palestinian and Israeli control. Area C, the rest of the West Bank, would remain under full
Israeli control during the initial withdrawal stage, though further Israeli withdrawals from Area C were planned for later
stages. Many of the provisions in the agreement underplayed the
fact that 73 percent of the West Bank would remain in Israeli
hands. (Area C, for example, was defined as areas “which, except
for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status
negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in accordance with this Agreement.”) Unfortunately, the
main map accompanying the agreement communicated the
opposite message.
The dominant visual elements of the map attached to the final
Interim Agreement are dozens of disconnected bright yellow
blotches. Each is surrounded by a thick red line, further emphasizing its isolation. Upon closer examination, you notice eight
brown blotches. The brown blotches mark Area A (full Palestinian control); the yellow archipelago is Area B (joint control). Area
C is absent from the key and there is no sign of the pre-1967 border, ominously implying that the fate of the 73 percent of the
West Bank designated for further Israeli withdrawals had
already been decided—in Israel’s favor.
Following Arafat’s dramatic walkout, the Israelis increased
their initial proposal for the yellow areas, Area B, by 5 percent,
and the Palestinian leader signed the agreement. But his opponents derided him for accepting the Swiss cheese map—a vision
of Palestinian sovereignty punctured by holes. The o≤cial map
reinforced the arguments of Oslo’s harshest critics, like Edward

Said, who saw the agreement as a humiliating capitulation to
Israeli expansionism.
Some people claim that the Oslo process was deliberately
designed to segregate Palestinians into isolated enclaves so that
Israel could continue to occupy the West Bank without the burden of policing its people. If so, perhaps the map inadvertently
revealed what the Israeli wordsmiths worked so diligently to
hide. Or perhaps Israel’s negotiators purposefully emphasized
the discontinuity of Palestinian areas to appease opposition
from the Israeli right, knowing full well that Arafat would fly
into a rage.
Neither is true. I know, because I had a hand in producing the
o≤cial Oslo II map, and I had no idea what I was doing. Late one
night during the negotiations, my commander took me from the
hotel where the talks were taking place to an army base, where he
led me to a room with large fluorescent light tables and piles of
maps everywhere. He handed me some dried-out markers,
unfurled a map I had never seen before, and directed me to trace
certain lines and shapes. Just make them clearer, he said. No cartographer was present, no graphic designer weighed in on my
choices, and, when I was through, no Gilad Sher reviewed my
work. No one knew it mattered.
aps record facts but, whether by design
or by accident, they also project worldviews and
function as arguments. Every map reflects a set of
judgments that influence the viewer’s impression
of the underlying data. The choice of colors and labels, the cropping, and the process of selecting what gets included and what
gets left out all combine to form a visual gestalt. A skilled
designer can make peace seem inevitable or impossible, reassuring or terrifying, logical or jumbled.
For the visually aware reader, this point will seem obvious.
Artists know that visual representations are as malleable as verbal ones. Peace negotiators tend to be passively aware that maps,
like charts and photographs, can be crafted to emphasize a certain
point of view. Since they can’t conduct a meaningful conversation
about borders without maps, however, they are forced to use a
tool they don’t know how to control, hoping that their good intentions will lead them in the right direction.
Many of the basic principles of information design parallel
well-known principles of good writing. “Vigorous writing is concise,” teach Strunk and White in their classic American prose
manual, The Elements of Style. “A sentence should contain no
unnecessary words, a paragraph no unnecessary sentences, for
the same reason that a drawing should have no unnecessary
lines and a machine no unnecessary parts.” The information
graphics guru Edward Tufte makes similar points about graphic
design, railing against what he calls “chartjunk”—the meaningless visual noise that clutters so many computer-generated
displays. E≠ective writing, say Strunk and White, reflects deliberate choices about micro and macro organization; good writers
strategically craft each sentence and paragraph so that the most
important ideas are placed in the most prominent positions.
Tufte similarly shows how muting secondary and structural
elements like arrows, grids, underlines, frames, legends, and
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he told me that he did not believe this was the intention. The
map, he said, was produced during optimistic times, implying
that its designers viewed the agreement as potentially good for
Palestinians. Logically, then, the map should have seemed like a
step along the way to a two-state solution; Area C should have
been associated with Areas A and B, not with Israel. Instead, as
with the o≤cial Oslo II map, the map’s message belied its
authors’ intentions.
Another map that associates Area C with Israel—though with
very di≠erent implications—is a map commissioned by Israel’s
Ministry of Foreign A≠airs and produced by Koret Communications. The company’s CEO, Reuven Koret, is also the publisher of
Israel Insider, a pro-settler website that has vilified Ariel Sharon
for his plan to withdraw from Gaza. The site’s list of hot topics

he main conceptual challenge in mapping the
Interim Agreement was how to depict Area C—the part
of the West Bank that remained in Israeli control when
the agreement was signed in 1995 but which was explicitly slated for further Israeli withdrawals, though the scope and
timing of these withdrawals would be determined at later
stages. As we have seen, rather than tackle this challenge, the
o≤cial map ignored it, neglecting to mark Area C altogether.
Since its signing, other mapmakers have struggled with how to
depict the agreement, and in
particular Area C. The results
demonstrate how di≠erently
the underlying data of Oslo II
can be interpreted—and how
di≤cult it can be to modulate
a map’s political symbolism.
Take, for an example at one
extreme, the map produced
by Applied Research Institute–Jerusalem, a Palestinian
research institute that publishes, among other resources,
A Geopolitical Atlas of Palestine, a cartographic history of
Israeli “colonization”and Palestinian dispossession.
In the ARIJ map, Palestinian-controlled areas seem like
little spots floating helplessly
in a petri dish. Area C—the
white space surrounding the
green and salmon islands—is
absent from the key and is virkoret oslo ii map Evoking the “Jordan option.”
tually indistinguishable from arij oslo ii map Areas A & B are like spots in a petri dish.
Israel. The pre-1967 border, which forms the silhouette of the area includes “peace process” in quotation marks, reflecting the
that some critics of Oslo argued should have comprised the new rightist view that the process was a sham because no peace
Palestinian state, hovers accusingly in the background. ARIJ’s is possible.
Koret’s map clearly designates Area C, acknowledging that the
mapmakers took care to label Palestinian cities with their Arabic
names, in some instances adding Hebrew or Western names agreement assigned a new legal category to it. But the territory’s
in parentheses: Al Khalil (Hebron), Ariha (Jericho), Al Quds color unmistakably associates it with Israel, a di≠erent shade of
(Jerusalem). The Jewish settlements in Gaza are labeled “Jewish blue. The yellow and brown of Areas A and B (slightly larger on
Colony Area.” The map includes the safe passage routes linking this map because it illustrates a further Israeli withdrawal after
the West Bank and Gaza, which were absent from the o≤cial the first Oslo II stage) implicitly associate them with Jordan to
map (they were depicted instead in a separate map attached to the east. Such an association subtly alludes to what is known as
the agreement). But the ARIJ map also includes checkpoints, one “the Jordan option”—the idea that Palestinians do not need a
new state because they already have one on the other side of the
of the enduring military faces of the occupation.
When I first saw this map, I assumed that its authors inten- river. (Most Israeli Jews dismiss this perspective, which is often
tionally designed it to argue that the agreement imprisoned coupled with a call for transferring Palestinians out of the JewPalestinians in what Oslo critics have called “apartheid-style Ban- ish state, as a dead end that will only perpetuate the conflict.)
tustans,” referring to the “cantons” that had enraged Arafat. But The frame, which includes the entire West Bank and just a small
when I spoke with Khaldoun Rishmawi, a unit director at ARIJ, portion of Israel, makes it seem as if the areas under Palestinian
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arij [2000; an atlas of palestine, the west bank and gaza]; koret communications ltd.

shadows reduces visual clutter and helps to clarify the primary
information. Tufte advocates “a visual hierarchy.” When everything is emphasized, “nothing is emphasized; the design will
often be noisy, cluttered, and informationally flat.”

2005 motro/empax and 13pt; soffer mapping, israel

control are relatively large. The map’s title as it appears on the
Ministry’s website is derived from the biblical names for the region
(Judea and Samaria), which also carries political significance,
asserting Jews’“historical right” to these territories.
The o≤cial map, ARIJ’s, and Koret’s all associate Area C with
Israel, making Oslo II seem, in one way or another, like a defeat
for Palestinians. At the opposite extreme, what would an Oslo-isgood-for-Palestinians version of the Interim Agreement look
like? How might a map argue, as some Oslo optimists did, that,
though the agreement left Area C in Israeli control for the time
being, the parties understood that most of it was designated for
the future Palestinian state?
Working with professional graphic designer Jonathan Corum
of 13pt and using as our base a map published in American medi-

full or partial Palestinian control (shades of gray). How could the
same man, thoughtful and aware enough to include this
nuanced map in his own book, sign o≠ on the infamous “Swiss
cheese”map in his o≤cial capacity as negotiator? I asked Ambassador Savir to explain the di≠erence between the two maps. I
wanted to know why the map in his book specifically delineates
Area C, whereas the original, o≤cial map did not. But he did not
acknowledge a meaningful di≠erence.

W

ill the authors of the next israeliPalestinian peace agreement learn from the
mistakes of Oslo? The signs are not promising.
Of the various proposed peace plans that have
surfaced since the Oslo process fell apart in 2001, only one, the
Geneva Accord, includes maps of what
a final settlement might look like. By
the time the accord was signed, I had
become a lawyer and had published a
graphic guide to United States income
tax law. I had also taught a seminar
at Yale College on the fledgling field
of visual communication and the law.
When I saw the Geneva maps, my
heart sank.
The Geneva Accord, though controversial, continues to play a pivotal role
in both societies’ e≠orts to end the
bloodshed between them. It catalyzed
Ariel Sharon’s push for a unilateral
Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and the
new Palestinian leadership’s principles for a final settlement of the conflict mirror the Geneva plan.
The crux of Geneva’s territorial
compromise is a plan for two states,
based on the pre-1967 border, with
one-to-one adjustments (Israel would
receive parts of the occupied territomotro/corum oslo ii map A two-state vision of Oslo II. savir oslo ii map The diplomat’s view.
ries, in exchange for Palestinian sovator Dennis Ross’s memoir,The Missing Peace, I recently produced ereignty over equal areas on the Israeli side of the border), plus
an alternative vision of Oslo II.
a corridor connecting the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A posiJonathan and I chose colors that clearly associate Area C with tive vision of this two-state idea should leap from Geneva’s
Palestinian-controlled Areas A and B. We labeled all West Bank maps. Instead, the hodgepodge of versions in Geneva web macities with their Arabic names, and we included the so-called terials, printed pamphlets, and public-relations packets are
“safe passage routes” linking Gaza and the West Bank.
filled with chartjunk, arbitrary colors and labels, inconsistenNaturally, while those committed to a two-state solution to the cies, and omissions. Flouting basic principles of visual rhetoric,
conflict might have been reassured (perhaps falsely) by this pic- Geneva’s maps obscure the simple reassuring elegance of the
ture, it would have terrified the Jewish residents of Area C and agreement’s proposed solution.
their supporters.
Several Geneva Initiative maps, for example, give visual priorBetween these two extremes would be a moderate interpre- ity to meaningless yellow boxes containing the map’s title and
tation of Oslo that takes the open-ended fate of Area C at face city labels. The maps also emphasize the pre-1967 border and
value. Such a map exists, and shows up in an unexpected, but the outlines of the areas slated to be swapped. They are certelling place: The Process, the memoir of chief Israeli negotiator tainly important elements, but the thick colored lines depictUri Savir.
ing them leave the viewer struggling to figure out what is
Here Area C—the hatched area—is unambiguously marked as being swapped for what. Geneva’s maps use red for the areas
distinct from Israel (white) as well as from areas coming under annexed to Palestine, which brings connotations of danger,
legala≠airs
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incorporated into Palestine are equal to areas in occupied territory slated to become part of Israel. We marked the corridor
with what amounts to a visual placeholder, indicating that its
route and form remain undetermined.
Israelis and Palestinians who support a two-state solution desperately need a positive picture that captures and bolsters their
fragile conviction that peace is possible. If Israelis and Palestinians talk peace again, getting the maps right will require a collaborative process of drafting and redrafting by the agreement’s
authors together with cartographers and graphic designers. This
process would produce better graphics, and it would reveal new
ways of seeing and therefore thinking about the agreement. It is
well known that writing forces us to confront the limits of our
own understanding, exposing logical gaps and unresolved
details, richness, and complexity
of which we are often unaware
before putting pen to paper. Writing also spurs creativity, helping
us see possibilities to which we
would otherwise be blind. Drawing does the same.
For this reason, negotiators who
spontaneously scribble notes and
diagrams—as both Uri Savir and
his Palestinian counterpart Ahmed
Qurei did during the Oslo process—
should be encouraged. But to be
e≠ective, o≤cial peace maps,
whether they are part of a legal
record, a blueprint for implementation, or a public education e≠ort,
must incorporate political, technical, and artistic sensibilities. Software (Geographic Information
Systems, for instance) and technicians with no design training are
not enough. A visually illiterate
negotiator with a sophisticated
geneva initiative map A study in “chartjunk.”
motro/corum geneva map Peace as possible.
mapping program and a technical
to the verbal “to be determined” language in the text of the assistant is no better equipped than a lousy writer with a stateGeneva agreement.
of-the-art word processing program.
I returned to my designer and together we tried to create a
Good maps alone will not be enough to bring peace, but poor
map that does justice to the spirit of Geneva.
design should not join the long list of pitfalls already burdening
This time I asked him to try a new color palette. The beige the peace process. Since the election this year of Mahmoud
and green of our Oslo maps reminded me of desert, military Abbas as Palestinian president, a fragile informal truce has raised
fatigues, and tanks. I wanted to create a di≠erent vision of hopes that, sooner or later, negotiators will again be arguing over
Israel and Palestine, especially since this map is not only for percentages of territory and safe passage routes. If the next
internal Israeli and Palestinian consumption. I wanted some- agreement’s maps make the same mistakes displayed by those
thing that would communicate to the world the lush, fertile attached to Oslo II and to Geneva, they will undermine the
face of the Holy Land (the area’s topography varies dramati- chances for success. If the new maps capture a vision that Israelis
cally, ranging from rich forests in the north to rocky desert in and Palestinians can live with, they may well tip the balance in
the south). We chose cool, calm hues from the Israeli and Pales- favor of peace.
n
tinian flags, and we coded the land-swap areas so that they are
clearly associated with the state to which they are slated to Shari Motro is an assistant professor of law at the University of
belong. The key adds another critical piece of information: Richmond and a senior fellow at Empax, a New York–based think
The size of areas on the Israeli side of the pre-1967 border tank that studies the role of graphics in diplomacy.
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aggression, and blood (the Hebrew words for “red” and “blood”
share the same root). The country labels are also relatively prominent, which is good; Palestine is no longer a dirty word, and
Geneva’s drafters were right to celebrate it. But repeating it twice
is a mistake. It threatens Israelis because the two “Palestines”
appear to surround little, vulnerable Israel; it threatens Palestinians because it emphasizes the disconnection of the West Bank
from the Gaza Strip.
The most egregious blunder in the o≤cial Geneva maps
is their omission of the corridor connecting the two parts of
Palestine. The specific route and form of the corridor have not
been determined, so including it on a map presents a graphic
design challenge. Still, omitting it altogether sends the wrong
message. What is required is a visual placeholder corresponding

